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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Some things cannot be described.  This is the theory that recent literary 
criticism has placed as its cornerstone.  Philosopher-critic Roland Barthes 
identified this trend in his Mythologies, stating that critics often ―suddenly 
decide that the true subject of criticism is ineffable, and criticism, as a con-
sequence, unnecessary.‖1  Unfortunately, this view has become singular 
within the legal academy whenever an author discusses music copyright 
infringement analysis.  It seems that scholars fear the thought of trusting a 
jury with such an ―ineffable‖ subject as music and must propose alterna-
tives, such as expert testimony, specialized courts, or mechanical analysis, 
  
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center (2009); M.M., College-Conservatory of Music, 
University of Cincinnati (2007); B.M., Samford University (2004).  This note was the winning entry in 
the second annual Pierce Law Student Symposium writing competition. 
 1. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 34 (Annette Lavers trans., 1972). 
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This article proposes that the simplest and best approach to music cop-
yright infringement litigation is to accept the jury‘s determination of sub-
stantial similarity in its most classic form.  Part II of this paper will explore 
the development of the current standards that the federal courts use in mu-
sic copyright infringement cases.  Part III will survey scholarly reactions to 
these standards, detailing and categorizing the variety of proposals put 
forth by different authors.  Part IV will describe the shortcomings and un-
necessary complexity of these proposals, advocating for the simplest and 
original approach put forth by the courts in Part II. 
II.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power 
to ―promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for li-
mited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries.‖3  Congress utilizes this power to grant 
rights and protection to owners of ―original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression.‖4 
The Copyright Act of 1976 grants several rights to a copyright holder: 
the right of reproduction, the right to prepare derivative works, the right to 
distribution, and the rights to perform, display, or transmit a work.
5
  There-
fore, a defendant may infringe any of these rights when she performs any 
of these actions and has ―done so without either the copyright owner‘s au-
thorization or the benefit of one of the limitations contained in §§ 107 
through 122.‖6 
In 1991‘s Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the 
Supreme Court announced the two-prong test for a prima facie copyright 
infringement action.
7
  First, the plaintiff must prove ―ownership of a valid 
copyright‖ and, second, ―copying of constituent elements that are origi-
nal.‖8  In order to meet the second prong of the Feist standard, the plaintiff 
  
 2. Alice J. Kim, Expert Testimony and Substantial Similarity: Facing the Music in (Music) Copy-
right Infringement Cases, 19 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 109, 109–10 (1995); Yvette Joy Liebesman, Using 
Innovative Technologies to Analyze for Similarity between Musical Works in Copyright Infringement 
Disputes, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 331, 334–35 (2007). 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 6. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 575 (7th ed. 2006). 
 7. 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 8. Id. 
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must prove two separate elements.  The plaintiff must first prove that the 
defendant copied her work—that is, that the defendant ―used the plaintiff‘s 
material as a model, template, or even inspiration.‖9  The plaintiff must 
also demonstrate that the copying is ―actionable‖ because the defendant 
copied the protected material.
10
 
A plaintiff may use several methods to prove that the defendant copied 
the work.  The most effective, and the most atypical, course is to present 
direct evidence of the copying.
11
  Another option requires the plaintiff to 
prove that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that there 
is ―probative similarity‖ between the two works that would indicate copy-
ing of the protected work.
12
  However, the plaintiff may forego the access 
requirement if the trier of fact finds that the defendant‘s work is ―strikingly 




In order to prove that the defendant‘s copying is ―actionable,‖ the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that there is ―substantial similarity‖ between the 
defendant‘s work and the protected portions of the copyrighted work.14  
―The determination of the extent of similarity that will constitute a sub-
stantial, hence infringing, similarity presents one of the most difficult 
questions in copyright law, and one that is the least susceptible of helpful 
generalizations.‖15  As discussed below, the difficulty of determining sub-
stantial similarity has led to many proposed models in academic writing, 
and many commentators argue that the judicial development of the sub-




A. Creating the “Modern” Test for Infringement 
The first case to formulate a test for actionable infringement was 
Emerson v. Davies,
17
 where the court held that the plaintiff must prove that 
―resemblances in those parts and pages are so close, so full, so uniform and 
striking, as fairly to lead to the conclusion that the one is a substantial copy 
of the other, or mainly borrowed from it.‖18  The question remained as to 
  
 9. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B] (2008). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Lisa Frank, Inc. v. Impact Int‘l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 980, 998 (D. Ariz. 1992). 
 12. Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in 
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1189–90 (1990). 
 13. See Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 891 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 14. Dan River, Inc. v. Sanders Sale Enters., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 15. 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.03. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436). 
 18. Id. at 622. 
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whom would be led to this conclusion, which would first be answered by 
the ―audience test.‖ 
The first announcement of the ―audience test‖ came in 1868‘s Daly v. 
Palmer,
19
 where the author of the play Under the Gaslight alleged that 
theatre owners copied a scene from his play and placed it in their own 
work, After Dark.
20
  The Daly court determined that infringement occurs 
when the two works are ―recognized by the spectator, through any of the 
senses to which the representation is addressed, as conveying substantially 
the same impressions to, and exciting the same emotions in, the mind, in 
the same sequence or order.‖21  Later courts used the Daly formulation, 
particularly the word ―spectator,‖ to create an ordinary observer standard.22  
For instance, the court in Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer
23
 clearly proposed 
that the lay observer should measure whether there is substantial similarity 
between the two works in question: 
The question really involved in such comparison is to ascertain the 
effect of the alleged infringing play upon the public, that is, upon 
the average reasonable man.  If an ordinary person who has recent-
ly read the story sits through the presentation of the picture, if 
there had been literary piracy of the story, he should detect that 
fact without any aid or suggestion or critical analysis by others.  




Though this model continued to serve as a foundation or starting point, 
the standard began to change as time passed and other jurisdictions created 
their own formulations. 
Judge Learned Hand waded through the difficulty of how to create a 
test for substantial similarity when he authored the Nichols v. Universal 
Pictures Corp. opinion.
25
  In that case, Judge Hand examined two plays 
that, while maintaining distinct elements, involved forbidden romance be-
  
 19. 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552). 
 20. Id. at 113334.  The scene involved a character being bound to railroad tracks and saved at the 
last possible moment.  Id.  This suspenseful device, or variations of it, has often been used in movies 
and television programming.  See generally LYNNE KIRBY, PARALLEL TRACKS: THE RAILROAD AND 
SILENT CINEMA (1997). 
 21. Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1138. 
 22. 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.03[E][2]. 
 23. 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933). 
 24. Id. at 18. 
 25. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).  Thirty years after Nichols, however, Judge Hand stated that 
―[o]bviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond the ‗idea,‘ and has 
borrowed its ‗expression.‘‖  Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 
1960). 
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tween Irish and Jewish lovers with the requisite family feuding.
26
  When 
attempting to frame the elements for similarity, he wrote: 
Upon any work and especially upon a play a great number of pat-
terns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and 
more of the incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no more 
than the most general statement of what the play is about and at 
times consist of only its title, but there is a point in this series of 
abstractions where they are no longer protected since otherwise the 
playwright could prevent the use of his ideas to which apart from 
their expression his property is never extended.
27
 
This doctrine mandates that finders of fact must separate the protected 
elements of expression from the unprotected idea that the work expresses.  
Judge Hand also determined that the question of similarity was to be de-
termined in the fashion of a ―spectator‖ and without expert testimony, 
which he thought ―cumbers the case and tends to confusion.‖28  Although 
this model was later criticized within its own circuit and was never univer-




B. The Arnstein Test 
A songwriter brought the first case that would reshape and craft the 
―audience test.‖  Ira B. Arnstein was a composer in the Tin Pan Alley era 
who ―believed plagiarists had deprived him of the rewards of his talent by 
infringing upon the copyrights to his compositions to their personal ag-
grandizement.‖30  Arnstein often pursued his infringement actions pro se 
and, as the New York Times often reported, played music before the court.
31
  
Indeed, his hostility towards defendants led to the papers printing his court-
room spats.  After playing music before the court, the defending attorney 
argued that Arnstein had manipulated his playing to magnify the existing 
similarities: 
―Is it not my privilege,‖ the plaintiff asked, ―to present my case be-
fore I am cross-examined?‖  Judge Conger silenced the attorney 
  
 26. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120. 
 27. Id. at 121. 
 28. Id. at 123. 
 29. Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938) (―It is naturally diffi-
cult to compare literary works by using the terminology of metaphysics, and the rule thus provided 
does not seem to have been used since its suggestion.‖). 
 30. B. MacPaul Stanfield, Note, Finding the Fact of Familiarity: Assessing Judicial Similarity Tests 
in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 489, 489 (2001). 
 31. Song Writer Plays Piano For Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1939, at 25. 
File: 05 Padgett, pg. 125 - v7i1 (1).doc Created on:  12/1/2008 3:22:00 PM Last Printed: 12/23/2008 6:33:00 PM 
130 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 1   
and assured Arnstein that he was entitled to his day in court.  
―How can I talk to that man?‖ the plaintiff asked when he was in-
terrupted again.  ―He is stupid.  Knows nothing of music.‖32 
Arnstein‘s suits (and he brought several) involved and angered many 
of his contemporary composers.  The Times reported that ―habitués of Tin 
Pan Alley came in swarms yesterday to Federal court and exchanged 
charges and angry glances during the last day of the trial of Ira B. 
Arnstein‘s plagiarism suit against the E. B. Marks Music Corporation.‖33  




In Arnstein v. Porter, the court divided the ―copying‖ analysis into the 
two-part test described above.
35
  The trier of fact must determine: ―(a) that 
defendant copied from plaintiff‘s copyrighted work and (b) that the copy-
ing (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to constitute improper appro-
priation.‖36  Besides the critical standard, the Arnstein court separates the 
analyses for evidentiary allowances.  To prove the copying prong, 
Arnstein, comparing the works in their entirety, allows for expert testimony 
and dissection within some limitations.
37
  The second analysis, however, 
forbids these types of admissions of evidence.  Here, the Arnstein court 
determined that the critical inquiry is ―whether defendant took from plain-
tiff‘s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who 
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that 
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plain-
tiff.‖38  This is to be performed with the limited aid of expert testimony or 
dissection: 
At the trial, plaintiff may play, or cause to be played, the pieces in 
such manner that they may seem to a jury to be inexcusably alike, 
in terms of the way in which lay listeners of such music would be 
likely to react. . . .  Expert testimony . . . should be utilized only to 
assist in determining the reactions of lay auditors.  The impression 
made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the 
musical excellence of plaintiff‘s or defendant‘s works are utterly 
immaterial on the issue of misappropriation.
39
   
  
 32. Id. 
 33. Music Suit Ends As Experts Scowl, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1935, at 25. 
 34. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 468. 
 38. Id. at 473. 
 39. Id. 
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However, courts and commentators have found that this prohibition 
does not suit a lay audience standard where non-literal copying is alleged 
and, therefore, allow for more generous expert testimony in such circums-
tances.
40
  These distinct analyses also warrant particular attention to the 
trier of fact for each.  The Arnstein court determined that the second analy-
sis—improper appropriation—is ―an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly 
fitted to determine.‖41  As discussed below, this distinction also yields a 
wealth of criticism from scholars, but the Arnstein test is not the only re-
calculation of the ―audience test.‖ 
C. The Krofft Test 
In the 1960s and 70s, Sid & Marty Krofft Productions ran the H. R. 
Pufnstuf show on Saturday morning television, which, historically, draws 
children audiences.
42
  The show had a ―generally psychedelic atmosphere,‖ 
and ―people have joked that ‗H. R.‘ stood for hand rolled.‖43 The New York 
Times described the show as ―the most ambitious of the Saturday morning 
event‖ but described and criticized the show as ―[employing] live actors 
and animation in which trees and castles talk‖ and ―[seeming] a bit confus-
ing—the fusion of reality and fantasy sometimes results in not one element 
or the other dominating.‖44  After McDonald‘s unveiled McDonaldland, its 
own fantasy world where Ronald McDonald lives, thieves steal hamburg-




The court in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDo-
nald’s Corp., like the Arnstein court, creates two categories for its analysis, 
which is formulated around Judge Learned Hand‘s dichotomy between 
ideas and expressions.  First, the court applies an ―extrinsic test,‖ in which 
the court examines ―specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed‖ to 
determine whether the ―general ideas‖ of the works are substantially simi-
lar.
46
  The court also allows for ―analytic dissection and expert testimony‖ 
and determines that ―this question may often be decided as a matter of 
law.‖47  After the court scrutinizes the ideas, it moves on to the expression 
  
 40. 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13[E][3][a]. 
 41. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
 42. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald‘s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
 43. TIMOTHY BURKE & KEVIN BURKE, SATURDAY MORNING FEVER 89, 130 (1999). 
 44. TV: More of the Same, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1969, at 95. 
 45. McDonald’s, 562 F.2d at 1161. 
 46. Id. at 1164; 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13[E][3][b]. 
 47. McDonald’s, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
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and applies the ―intrinsic test.‖48  This test ―[depends] on the response of 
the ordinary reasonable person‖ and asks ―whether there is substantial si-
milarity in the expressions of the ideas so as to constitute infringement.‖49  
The court, for the intrinsic test, prohibits ―analytic dissection and expert 
testimony.‖50  Though the Arnstein and Krofft courts remained faithful to 
the ordinary or lay observer standard, one jurisdiction has abandoned, or 
reformulated, that standard. 
D. The Dawson Variation 
In Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., the famed spiritual arranger Wil-
liam Dawson sued Hinshaw Music, Inc. and composer Gilbert Martin for 
infringement of his arrangement of ―Ezekiel Saw De Wheel.‖51  The Daw-
son court examined the Arnstein opinion and found that the ―lay listener‖ 
standard was for the protection of a work where the general public was the 
targeted audience—a popular work.52  To the Dawson court, this suggests 
that the jury should consist of a sample of the market that creates the eco-
nomic incentive for the creation of the work.
53
  Therefore, a lay jury will be 
proper ―only where the lay public fairly represents the works‘ intended 
audience.‖54  Otherwise, ―the ultimate comparison of the works at issue 
[should] be oriented towards the works‘ intended audience.‖55  The court 
then attempted to apply its own test, determining possible intended au-
diences for the work: 
It may be that a popular recording of a love ditty pitched at the 
broadest of audiences is marketed to the general public far more so 
than is a spiritual arrangement.  It is quite possible that spiritual ar-
rangements are purchased primarily by choral directors who pos-
sess specialized expertise relevant to their selection of one ar-
rangement instead of another.  Whereas a lay person‘s reaction 
may be an accurate indicator of the extent to which those in the 
market for a popular recording will perceive another recording to 
be substantially similar, a lay person‘s reaction might not be an ac-
  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 905 F.2d 731, 732 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 52. Id. at 734. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 733. 
 55. Id. at 734. 
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Though these formulations are variations on the ordinary or lay listener 
standards, scholars have proposed a variety of ways to limit or remove the 
jury‘s role in this infringement analysis when it is applied to cases that 
involve music. 
III.  THE DIFFICULTIES OF MUSIC 
Generally, the authors who have written about substantial similarity in 
music copyright infringement cases agree that music is unique among the 
arts.  However ―unique‖ an author might find music, authors rarely attempt 
to explain the complexities, relying instead on the social cliché that music 
is difficult, and, when they do explain, they merely list the common ele-
ments listed in the first chapter of any music appreciation textbook: 
[T]he Krofft test for similarity of ideas, as drafted, applies to all 
forms of expression, yet ignores the unique aspects of certain types 
of expression.  Music is particularly ill-suited to the analysis de-
signed by Krofft; due to music‘s inherently distinctive features 




As simplistic as any given popular tune might sound, it, like all pieces 
of music, contains elements of ―melody, harmony, . . . rhythm(,) . . . 
(t)imbre (tonal quality), tone, pitch, tempo, spatial organization, conson-
ance, dissonance, phrasing, accents, note choice, combinations, interplay of 
instruments, . . . bass lines, and the new technological sound.‖58 
A more convincing argument would be to document music critics‘ own 
battles with how to describe music for their readers.  If a critic cannot 
properly explain, in precise language, what happens in a musical composi-
tion, the ability of jurors to comprehend and have a dialogue about what 
they perceive should be even more improbable.  Still, these authors fail to 
explain how music is different from a movie or a play, which, in their own 
right, have ―inherently distinctive features‖ and ―elements‖ that comprise 
the unit.  However, scholars find that music‘s complexity lies beyond any 
human understanding, which makes the result of an infringement suit un-
  
 56. Id. at 737. 
 57. Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An Improved Approach for Deter-
mining Substantial Similarity, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 277, 278 (1993). 
 58. Kim, supra note 2, at 12425 (quoting Debra Presti Brent, The Successful Music Copyright 
Infringement Suit: The Impossible Dream, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 229, 248–49 (1990)). 
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predictable.
59
  This unpredictability, scholars argue, leads to the ―unneces-
sary stifling of creativity.‖60 
Another trope within the literature on this topic is that the trier of fact 
is not to be trusted with the interpretation of art.  The most straightforward 
incantation of this theme is the following: 
[C]ourts should consider using new tools to help determine the 
level of similarity between two musical works in infringement 
suits.  With regard to musical works, the current method relies too 
heavily on each judge‘s subjective value judgment or the jury act-
ing as a proxy for the intended audience of the music.
61
 
Some commentators even fear that a juror‘s tone-deafness could de-
stroy a party‘s case.62  Therefore, the authors propose a variety of means, 
which are explored below, that will limit or remove the subjective insights 
of the trier of fact.  Often, however, the authors support their proposals by 
alleging that the judicial formulations are deficient. 
A. The Alleged Problems with the Tests 
The authors attack the substantial similarity tests, described in Part II 
of this article, in three ways: by alleging that the test is too vague, by alleg-
ing the test is confusing, and alleging that it creates an expert testimony 
battle.  The most simplistic criticism of the tests is that they are too vague.  
For instance, Stephanie Jones, in her analysis of the Krofft formulation, 
argues that the test fails because ―the courts have offered no sound guide-
lines for defining or interpreting musical ideas in copyright actions.‖63  
While Jones finds it ―necessary‖ to create a ―consistent definition of musi-
cal idea,‖ however, she fails to do so beyond the broadest generalities:  
[A] musical idea is a musical thought which implies a self-
contained entity; however, it generally represents only a portion or 
fragment of a musical work which usually contains multiple ideas.  
A musical idea may be: 1) a single line of pitch or rhythm (melod-
ic); 2) a vertical group of pitches (harmonic or chordal); 3) a series 
  
 59. Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to Earth, 98 
DICK. L. REV. 181, 181–82 (1994). 
 60. Id. at 182. 
 61. Liebesman, supra note 2, at 33435. 
 62. J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright Protection, 10 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 436 (2004). 
 63. Jones, supra note 57, at 295. 
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of time values without pitch (rhythmic); or 4) a combination of 
pitch, rhythm and chord(s).
64
 
While her definition may remain consistent, it fails to offer any clearer 
picture of what a musical idea is.  Furthermore, it reaffirms Judge Learned 




Stephanie Jones also criticizes the Arnstein/Krofft framework as inhe-
rently confusing, arguing that the two-tiered analysis serves to confuse 
juries.
66
  Both portions of each test require that the trier of fact analyze the 
similarity between the music.  However, the results of finding similarity 
are different for each stage.
67
  In the Arnstein analysis, for example, a find-
ing of similarity proves only that the defendant copied the work, but a find-
ing of similarity in the second part serves to prove that the copying is ac-
tionable.
68
  Jones argues that the trier of fact‘s finding of similarity in the 
first prong might bleed over into the analysis under the second prong: ―[a]s 
a result, the test is confusing at best and at worst can distort and skew the 
outcome of music copyright actions.‖69  However, Jones fails to address 
the fact that, under the Arnstein standard, the second prong (actionability 
analysis) is a question of fact while the first prong (copying) may be an 
issue of law.
70
  The fact that the judge and jury could separately evaluate 
the two prongs should alleviate the ability of one finding to influence the 
other.  Further, Jones does not mention that scholars, influencing both 
judges and attorneys, are clear to draw a difference between the two simi-
larity analyses‘ nomenclature.71  The copying analysis looks for ―probative 
similarity‖ while the actionable analysis determines whether ―substantial 
similarity‖ exists.72  While this language is not uniform across courts, it 
surely helps to alleviate the confusion and overlap between the analyses. 
The final criticism of the deficiency of the substantial similarity tests is 
that the vague standards lead to conflicting expert testimony, resulting in a 
contest where the credibility of the expert is the determining factor of the 
case—a contest determined by the academic credentials (not the particular 
expertise) of the witness.
73
  Further, ―[t]he witnesses called to present tes-
  
 64. Id.  
 65. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 66. Jones, supra note 57, at 295–96. 
 67. See supra Part I. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Jones, supra note 57, at 295–96. 
 70. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 47273 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 71. See Latman, supra note 12, at 118990. 
 72. Id. 
 73. John R. Autry, Note, Toward a Definition of Striking Similarity in Infringement Actions for 
Copyrighted Musical Works, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 113, 120 (2002). 
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timony regarding musicological and theoretical comparisons are uniformly 
classically trained and educated. . . .  [E]ven when the compositions being 
compared are ‗pop‘ songs and the expert has little knowledge of the specif-
ic genre.‖  But ―[c]ourts tend to afford greater deference to the empirical 
findings of an expert whose curriculum vitae includes professorial ap-
pointments at universities which traditionally symbolize a high level of 
musical scholarship (The Juilliard School, Indiana University, Eastman 
School of Music, etc.).‖74 
John Autry, the author who discusses this problem at length, relies on 
empirical knowledge to criticize the experts‘ knowledge and the courts‘ 
deference towards them.
75
  While such generalities may seem to echo a 
―common sense‖ conclusion, one look at Donald J. Grout‘s A History of 
Western Music, the staple music history textbook, reveals that there are 
entire chapters that explore the popular idiom, demonstrating that popular-
ly conceived distinctions between ―popular‖ and ―artistic‖ styles do not 
exist in musicology.
76
  Autry does land a valid criticism that conflicting 
expert testimony requires the trier of fact to determine which of the experts 
is most credible.  This fact, however, is a problem in any kind of case that 
involves expert testimony.
77
  Additionally, the substantial similarity tests 
impose significant restraints on expert testimony, which serve to eliminate 
much of Autry‘s concern.78 
B. Proposed Solutions 
These concerns guide scholars‘ approaches to proposing solutions to 
address what each particular scholar perceives to be the problem with the 
substantial similarity tests.  Generally, the propositions fall into two cate-
gories: substantive solutions and procedural solutions.  The names of these 
categories, however, depart from their familiar meanings.  Substantive 
solutions are those proposals that would alter the substantial similarity 
tests.  In contrast, procedural solutions would change who determines 
whether substantial similarity exists in a particular case.  This section will 
  
 74. Id. at 120–21. 
 75. Autry was classically trained at Samford University and pursued a professional career in opera 
before initiating his legal career. 
 76. J. PETER BURKHOLDER ET AL., A HISTORY OF WESTERN MUSIC 844–64 (7th ed. 2006). 
 77. Dwight J. Davis et al., Expert Opinion in Class Certifications: Second Circuit Revisits, Dis-
avows in re Visa Check and Joins Majority Rule, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 253, 257 (2007) (discussing class 
certification cases); Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of 
New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 431–32 (2007) (discussing administrative law 
cases); Yane Svetiev, Antitrust Governance: The New Wave of Antitrust, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 593, 612 
(2007) (discussing antitrust cases). 
 78. See supra Part I. 
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first explore these procedural solutions and then move to the substantive 
solution proposals. 
1.  Procedural Solutions 
The procedural solutions generally seek to change the characteristics of 
the trier of fact: the judge or jury.  Each of the proposals discussed below 
suggests that the triers of fact should consist of a group that has a particular 
understanding or sophistication regarding copyright law.  First, Michael 
Landau and Donald Biederman argue for a specialized copyright court with 
nationwide jurisdiction.
79
  Though their analysis does not focus on music 
cases only, the authors are particularly concerned with inconsistencies be-
tween various courts and the complexity of copyright law—themes re-
peated by the other authors at hand.
80
  In this proposal, the authors would 
remove many issues from the jury at the trial level and would ―[follow] the 
model of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the vehicle 
through which uniformity of treatment could be achieved.‖81 
The second type of procedural proposal, suggesting that the jury 
should be more informed, is specifically targeted towards music infringe-
ment cases.  Paul Grinvalsky‘s proposal requires that the jury consist of the 
intended audience for the work.
82
  His reasoning is based on the dissenting 
opinion in Arnstein, which states that where there exists ―artistic repug-
nance or boredom, or mere distance . . . all sounds . . . merge.‖83  Grin-
valsky examines the jury‘s familiarity with the works and determines that 
―distance to music skews the substantial similarity plane and affects the 
ultimate findings of fact.  An unintended audience may find that the two 
works sound substantially alike where an intended audience may find the 
two works fall short of substantial similarity.‖84  Further, he supports his 
claim with Dawson, which found that a trier of fact that was not composed 
of the intended audience of a spiritual arrangement ―was incapable of de-
tecting, much less appreciating, their similarity or dissimilarity.‖85  Grin-
valsky determines that only the intended audience for the work should de-




 79. Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright Court: Elimi-
nating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 719 (1999). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Paul M. Grinvalsky, Idea-Expression in Musical Analysis and the Role of the Intended Audience 
in Music Copyright Infringement, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 396 (1992). 
 83. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 476 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
 84. Grinvalsky, supra note 82, at 423. 
 85. Id. at 428. 
 86. Id. at 396. 
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There are similar arguments in the procedural category, discussed below, 
that support further expert testimony to create a more informed jury.  Grin-
valsky‘s approach, however, is likely unmanageable.  To create the sort of 
jury that Grinvalsky desires means that the copyright infringement case 
becomes more complex with another layer of analysis.  In fact, the ques-
tion of substantial similarity between the two works will remain, but will 
be preceded by whether the jury is substantially knowledgeable.  Further, 
there is no proof that this will lead to more accurate or more uniform re-
sults. 
2.  Substantive Solutions 
Substantive solutions are those proposals that would alter the substan-
tial similarity tests.  This category represents a wider range of proposals—
from simply changing the order of the tests‘ application to requiring tech-
nological analysis of the music.  However, each solution addresses the 
author‘s perceived problem with the current test or application of the test. 
The first substantive proposal that this section will consider is to re-
verse the order of the Krofft analysis, the suggestion of Stephanie Jones.
87
  
Particularly, Jones wants the jury to first determine copying without the aid 
of any expert testimony; then, the jury will hear evidence, including expert 
testimony, as to whether the defendant copied protected elements.
88
 
Certainly, such expert testimony could be taken prior to listening to the 
songs; however, it would probably be necessary for the jury to listen to the 
material in order to follow and understand the expert testimony.  There-
fore, the fact finders‘ aural impressions of the material would likely be 
affected by the expert‘s own impressions of the material.  If the jury first 
listens to the material without any outside influence, however, the decision 
it would render would be far more pristine than if it considers the songs 
after hearing expert testimony.  It is less likely that the jury‘s determination 
that the material sounds similar would influence their consideration of the 
objective expert testimony than that the expert testimony would influence 
the jury‘s aural impressions.89 
While Jones‘s proposition is sound in its ideals, it is founded on the 
principle that the jury is the trier of fact for both prongs of the analysis 




 87. Jones, supra note 57, at 303–04. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 304. 
 90. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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Jones‘s second idea is for the substantial similarity test to adopt a pre-
cise definition of ―musical idea.‖91  As quoted above, Jones suggests that 
we adopt the following definition: 
[A] musical idea is a musical thought which implies a self-
contained entity; however, it generally represents only a portion or 
fragment of a musical work which usually contains multiple ideas.  
A musical idea may be: 1) a single line of pitch or rhythm (melod-
ic); 2) a vertical group of pitches (harmonic or chordal); 3) a series 
of time values without pitch (rhythmic); or 4) a combination of 
pitch, rhythm and chord(s).
92
 
The problem on the face of this proposal is that each musical idea is 
different.  Jones admits as much by trying to list examples of musical 
ideas: 
 A musical idea may consist of a single note, rhythm or chord.  
For example, the opening ―idea‖ of the song ―One‖ consists of a 
single note, followed by [a] rest. 
 More often, however, a melodic or musical idea consists of 
two or more notes (pitch and rhythm).  Some examples of compo-
sitions that contain such ideas are: 
2-Note Musical Ideas: ―Feelings‖ ―People‖ ―Sunny‖ ―Lady‖ 
3-Note Musical Ideas: ―Yesterday‖ 
4-Note Musical Ideas: ―Sleepy Time Gal‖ ―We Are the World‖ 
10-Note Musical Ideas: ―They All Laughed (At Christopher Co-
lumbus)‖93 
Jones‘s definition and examples do not solve any of the problems; ra-
ther, she only reinforces the idea that fact-finding is necessary on a case-
by-case basis.  Further, Jones‘s definition has essentially already been 
adopted because it is so broad that it describes nearly every musical event 
that could exist in any work, infringing or not.  To adopt this definition 
would only be to codify a redundant definition because the case would 
already be limited to the vocabulary of music.  While Jones seems to want 
to limit the amount of information the jury might have, other authors pro-
pose that expert testimony should be allowed throughout the entire analy-
sis. 
  
 91. Jones, supra note 57, at 301. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 301–02. 
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Jeffrey Cadwell admits that the ―idea-expression dichotomy‖ is diffi-
cult to analyze in music infringement cases.
94
  This, he argues, means that 
juries must have expert testimony to guide them through the analysis: 
 One of the most frequent criticisms of both the Arnstein and 
Krofft approaches is that they proscribe expert testimony where it 
is needed most.  During the improper appropriation prong, 
Arnstein allows an expert to comment on how a lay listener might 
hear the two pieces of music at issue in the case, but not as to im-
proper appropriation itself.  Krofft entirely disallows expert testi-
mony during its intrinsic prong.  Therefore, after the expert 
presents testimony as to whether elements of the plaintiff‘s music 
have been copied by the defendant, the trier of fact must make a 
decision without the aid of the expert as to whether the defendant 
has improperly appropriated from the plaintiff‘s music.95 
Additionally, Cadwell emphasizes, as Jones did, that the jury, assum-
ing they did hear the expert testimony in the first prong of the analysis, 
must have ―conveniently short memory‖ in order to find appropriately in 
the second prong‘s analysis.96  To Cadwell, the answer, instead of revers-
ing the order as Jones suggests, is to offer expert testimony at each juncture 
of the finding: ―[t]hus, the trier of fact is not asked to ignore the expert‘s 
testimony, but rather to embrace it in order to make a more fully informed 
decision as to whether infringement has occurred.‖97 
Alice Kim joins in the conclusion that expert testimony should be of-
fered throughout the entire analysis but departs in the reasoning.  Kim, like 
Gravinsky, contends that ―the judgment should be informed by people who 
are familiar with the media at issue.‖98  Where Gravinsky sought to limit 
the jury pool to those who were the intended audience, Kim proposes that 
the jury must be brought to that standard by allowing expert testimony: 
 When not informed by expert testimony, the lay-observer test 
is improperly narrow in scope, protecting the copyright holder only 
when, according to the caprice of the general public (as 
represented by the jury or trier of fact) an impression of theft is 
deemed extant.  It is not only underinclusive but also overinclu-
sive: by not providing the factfinder with expert guidance, the sys-
tem could trap as infringers those whose musical creations bear no 
  
 94. Jeffrey Cadwell, Expert Testimony, Scènes à Faire, and Tonal Music: A (Not So) New Test for 
Infringement, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 137, 157 (2005). 
 95. Id. at 161 (italics added, citations omitted). 
 96. Id. at 163 (internal quotes omitted). 
 97. Id. at 169. 
 98. Kim, supra note 2, at 109.  
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true substantial similarity to the complainant‘s work but seem to 
do so because, for example, the performers‘ vocal styles are simi-
lar, or—more problematically—because both works use material 
so commonplace that it is considered public domain.
99
 
Rather, Kim suggests, the courts should allow expert testimony into the 
second prong analysis so juries will be able to make sophisticated judg-
ments and not be led astray by irrelevant similarities.
100
 
There are two distinct problems with expanding the roles of expert tes-
timony.  First, judges have indicated that the most prevalent problem asso-
ciated with expert testimony is that experts do not independently appraise 
the case at hand but, rather, ―become advocates for the side that hired 
them.‖101  Indeed, further expanding the role of the expert witness and her 
exposure to the jurors would only serve, as John Autry discussed, to create 
a battle to hire the most credible expert witness.
102
  The second problem is 
―the excessive expense of hiring [these] experts.‖103  While this argument 
may be dampened by the fact that the parties will likely already have hired 
experts for the first prong analysis, the need for experts for both questions 
will increase fees by requiring the expert to be retained for a longer period 
of time and by increasing the importance of hiring the best expert that a 
party can (or cannot) afford.  While this proposal creates some difficulties, 
others seek to replace experts with mathematical models that will provide 
objective data instead of a subjective opinion. 
Yvette Joy Liebesman concludes that the primary reason that many 
cases turn on adverse evidence is that the act of ―analyzing a song under 
the broad, artistic categories of harmony, melody, structure, and rhythm . . 
. leads to contradictory results and conflicting expert testimony.‖104  Lie-
besman proposes two methods by which to alleviate this disparity.  First, 
she proposes a ―Mega-Element Analysis,‖ whereby each song will be ana-
lyzed with hundreds of predetermined criteria along the lines of the Music 
Genome Project (MGP).
105
  In the MGP: 
Each song is analyzed by a trained musical expert for up to 400 
distinct musical characteristics and grouped into larger categories 
such as harmony, rhythm, structure, melody, vocals, and lyrics.  
For example, the harmony aspect of a song is analyzed for about 
  
 99. Id. at 128. 
 100. Id. at 122. 
 101. Christina L. Studebaker et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Re-
garding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 309, 327 (2002). 
 102. Autry, supra note 73, at 12021. 
 103. Studebaker, supra note 101, at 327. 
 104. Liebesman, supra note 2, at 345. 
 105. Id. at 346–47. 
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twenty attributes, including keys, modality, and general harmonic 
structure; vocals is broken down into approximately thirty-five 
attributes, such as vibrato, range, and gender.
106
 
Liebesman believes that providing an expansive list of criteria will 
lead to greater uniformity among results and that an excessive amount of 
subjective data will become objective in its totality.
107
  The most troubling 
aspect of this approach is its dependence on a recorded performance of the 
music.  Indeed, the underlying work behind every recording is the actual 
composition, rendering elements like ―vibrato, range, and gender‖ mea-
ningless within an infringement action on the underlying work.
108
 
Liebesman‘s second proposal is to create a ―Mathematical Modeling 
Analysis,‖ which would ―analyze the distinct characteristics of a musical 
tune.‖109  Using what Liebesman refers to as ―the physics of music,‖ courts 
or parties using this test must ―[dissect the songs] into mathematical for-
mulas representing their physical components.‖110  Further, they must clas-
sify works by genre and create a base-level of similarity among the works 
in that genre, representing the unprotected elements of a song.
111
  The fact 
finder must then look at the similarities between the two works in question 
that go beyond this base level and place it against a pre-determined 
scale.
112
  Liebesman offers this illustration:  
For example, if there were an infringement dispute regarding two 
country-western songs, one could mathematically compare the two 
songs as well as other country-western tunes.  One might learn that 
all country-western tunes are at least 60% alike, yet there is a 95% 
correlation between the two songs in question with no other song 
greater than 70% similar.
113
 
This data would then be used in the copying and improper appropria-
tion inquiries.
114
  Liebesman suggests that the higher burden for striking 
similarity would be adjusted within the mathematical findings, requiring a 




 106. Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. at 347; see JOYCE ET AL., supra note 6, at 165–66. 
 109. Liebesman, supra note 2, at 353. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 354. 
 112. Id. at 354–55. 
 113. Id. at 354. 
 114. Id. at 355. 
 115. Id. at 355 (―[I]t could be assumed that any similarity below a certain percentage is that of non-
copyrightable material.  It is only when the similarity would rise above a determined percentage, either 
overall or from the separate components, that the work would be considered substantially similar 
enough to the allegedly infringed work to be considered infringing.‖). 
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Liebesman‘s proposed solution doesn‘t address the problem that she 
identified.  As noted above, she criticized copyright cases that turn on ad-
verse evidence, and determined that the underlying problem is that ―ana-
lyzing a song under the broad, artistic categories of harmony, melody, 
structure, and rhythm . . . leads to contradictory results and conflicting ex-
pert testimony.‖116  Her solutions, however, are rooted in this same type of 
analysis and simply turn that data into another form.  The Mega-Element 
Analysis is simply a fuller-bodied analysis of harmony, melody, structure, 
and rhythm.  Liebesman, it seems, is only giving names and categories to 
the analysis that already occurs in the courtroom.  The Mathematical Mod-
eling Analysis is no different.  When she discusses the types of characteris-
tics that the mathematical algorithms would analyze, she offers an ―overall 
similarity‖ or a more categorized analysis: ―several algorithms could com-
pare the similarity of recognized characteristics of the two songs, such as 
harmony, melody, and structure.‖117  If this is true, then Liebesman is 
merely suggesting that the court involve mathematicians in a trial to trans-
form what is ordinarily expressed in prose into a mathematical formula.  
For example, the plaintiff‘s musicologist, in the traditional manner, would 
tell the jury what was happening in the music and claim that a majority of 
these events were similar between the two works.  Liebesman would re-
place the musicologist with a mathematician who would have prepared a 
mathematical formula and give a precise statistic that captures the same 
outcome that the musicologist was describing.  In an adversarial system, 
surely Liebesman intends that both parties will have mathematicians 
present evidence.  Therefore, Liebesman‘s proposal leaves the court with 
adverse evidence that describes the musical works, as must be done, in 
―broad, artistic categories.‖118  Her plan also faces other problems. 
Liebesman describes two ―hurdles‖ that her proposals must overcome 
before being effectively implemented: meeting the standard for evidentiary 
admissibility and familiarizing jurors with the system so that they are ―suf-
ficiently comfortable.‖119  Her proposal, however, particularly the Mathe-
matical Modeling Analysis, suffers from a conceptual flaw: it is rooted in a 
sound recording rather than the underlying work.  Nimmer on Copyright is 
vigilant in maintaining this distinction:  
A sound recording must be distinguished from, on the one hand, 
the material object on which the sound is recorded,
 
and, on the oth-
er, the underlying musical composition, or dramatic or literary 
  
 116. Id. at 345. 
 117. Id. at 354. 
 118. Id. at 345. 
 119. Id. at 356–57. 
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work that is recorded and transposed into aural form by the sound 
recording.  Clearly, a sound recording copyright vests no proprie-
tary rights in the material object as such.  Likewise, the sound re-
cording copyright does not attach to the underlying work per se, 
but only to the aural version of such work as fixed on the material 
object.  A sound recording is, in this sense, a derivative work.
120
 
Still, the foundation of Liebesman‘s math-based proposal is that, ―[a]t 
its most fundamental level, music is sound.‖121  This is true to some extent, 
but it is not necessarily true in copyright law.  There, a ―musical work,‖ not 
defined in the Copyright Act, may be embodied in any tangible medium—
not necessarily an audio medium.
122
  Liebesman, however, relies on the 
sonic qualities of a musical work for her analysis: ―[m]usical sounds can be 
broken down to their most elemental musical tones and represented 
through mathematical equations.‖123  However, if there is an underlying 
work beyond the recording that the mathematician uses, then the results are 
skewed by this derivative work.  Under copyright law principles, therefore, 
Liebesman‘s Mathematical Modeling Analysis has little, if any, actual util-
ity. 
Beyond this point, Liebesman herself recognizes that there will be an 
issue with a jury‘s comfort with her proposals.124  To mean anything, her 
new tests must either be fully accepted by the jury (because they are ―ob-
jective‖) or they must be merely more evidence that the jury may weigh.  
Faced with the Seventh Amendment, Liebesman chooses the latter.
125
  If 
the jury is bound by the evidence presented, then there would be no mea-
ningful jury trial because the jury would be resigned to affirming a finding 
that it did not truly make.  Liebesman‘s solution, however, furthers the 
problem that she attempts to remedy.  She offers that ―the MMA test could 
lead to the presentation of more objective testimony with which a jury may 
be more comfortable—they may want to rely less on emotions and more on 
facts.‖126  However, the ―emotions‖ that Liebesman identifies are the opi-
nions offered by expert musicologists; she never identifies the true differ-
ence between the analytical tools used by musicologists and mathemati-
cians.
127
  Rather, she relies on a rhetoric that categorizes music as ―emo-
  
 120. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A][2] (2008). 
 121. Liebesman, supra note 2, at 349. 
 122. 1 NIMMER, supra note 120, § 2.05 [A]. 
 123. Liebesman, supra note 2, at 353. 
 124. See id. at 356–57 (stating that making juries ―sufficiently comfortable‖ with either the MEA or 
MMA test is one of two legal ―hurdles‖ that must be overcome‖). 
 125. See id. at 360 (―The Supreme Court has affirmed that, under the Seventh Amendment, parties to 
an infringement suit have the right to have their case tried by a jury.‖). 
 126. Id. at 361. 
 127. Id. at 360–61. 
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tional‖ or ―ineffable.‖  While the musicologist‘s opinion is ―subjective,‖ it 
surely isn‘t ―emotional.‖  How does the mathematician‘s testimony differ 
in any significant way?  Surely the music theory texts and mathematical 
texts are more similar than Liebesman allows for. 
Laura Lape calls for another type of substantive change in the copy-
right infringement analysis: replace the substantial similarity requirement 
with a substantial harm test.
128
  Lape perceives that the current tests do not 
have any real meaning or predictability and that this leads to ―overprotec-
tion of copyright, with consequent unnecessary stifling of creativity.‖129  
Lape argues that the protection of copyright should only be allowed to the 
extent that the Constitution allows Congress to inspire further creation by 
protecting creation.
130
  From there, she explains that the right should be 
limited by its ―rational ends‖ and that, if no harm comes from infringe-
ment, the plaintiff should not have a cause of action.
131
 
Lape instructs adherers to ―consider any injury that may have an im-
pact on authors‘ incentive to create, including: economic harm, harm to 
reputation, loss of privacy, and loss of artistic control,‖ arguing that ―in-
fringement will be found less frequently than is currently the case.‖132  
Lape safeguards this conclusion by requiring that the harm found be ―sub-
stantial.‖133  Lape‘s argument becomes unsettled when she describes how 
the substantialness requirement will interact with the plaintiff‘s loss of 
control injury: 
For example, due to his relentless self-promotion, L. Ron Hubbard, 
the founder of the Church of Scientology, should not be able to es-
tablish infringements of portions of his unpublished letters and di-
aries, copied by a critical biographer, on grounds of loss of priva-
cy.  Similarly, infringement should not be based on loss of artistic 
control where the defendant has purchased prints and books law-
fully reproducing the plaintiff‘s works of art and has glued each 
print or page to a ceramic tile.  In such a case, no change was made 
in plaintiff‘s works other than the framing device.  While protec-
tion of the copyright owner from negligible harm offers little or no 
incentive to create, such protection affirmatively impoverishes our 
  
 128. Lape, supra note 59, at 182.  It should be noted that Lape‘s article discusses substantial similari-
ty in general terms—not only with music.  See generally id.  I have included her perspective because of 
the seriousness of her arguments and their weight in the literature. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 195–96. 
 131. Id. at 196. 
 132. Id. at 202. 
 133. Id. at 204–05. 
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cultural interchange by diminishing the tools of communication 
available to later creators.
134
 
Lape fails to realize that, though the plaintiff‘s creative work is com-
plete, there is nothing to stop the plaintiff from creating another work—
except the realization that she would lose control of how it would be 
framed.  Therefore, Lape‘s proposal would require the court to make a 
valuation of the artistic merit of each party.  If the plaintiff could offer 
more creative works in quantity or quality than the defendant, then the 
plaintiff should win because there is a perceived harm and the plaintiff 
needs further assurance as an incentive to create.  Any other holding, the 
plaintiff could argue, would impoverish her ability to confidently create 
further work.  Surely, this system would fail or require Lape to abandon 
the Constitutional purpose of incentivizing further creation. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Courts should continue to employ the Arnstein lay listener inquiry in 
its purest form.  The academic articles on this topic confuse the jury with 
the ―lay listener.‖  Further, the only problem they identify with the current 
tests is that litigation outcomes are difficult to predict.  Courts should ac-
cept the lay listener test along with the non-specialized jury‘s involvement 
in that determination.  This approach agrees with the concept that an im-
portant element of musical composition is the audience‘s perception. 
The proposals detailed in Part III confuse the jury for the ―lay listener‖ 
of the infringement test.  For instance, Stephanie Jones suggested that the 
jury should make an initial determination of copying without expert testi-
mony.
135
  Jones seems to root her proposal in the proposition that the jury 
is the lay listener.  Rather, the ―lay listener‖ test is similar to a ―reasonable 
person‖ inquiry in other areas of law.  While a jury will not always consist 




The academic positions surveyed above must remain in academia—
locked in the Ivory Tower.  The cited scholars have constructed, with good 
intentions, methods that would eliminate the jury‘s role in determining 
music copyright infringement.  What each of the authors identify is a prob-
  
 134. Lape, supra note 59, at 204–05. 
 135. Jones, supra note 57, at 303–04 (―If the jury first listens to the material without any outside 
influence, . . . the decision it would render would be far more pristine than if it considers the songs after 
hearing expert testimony.‖). 
 136. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (―[W]e have an issue of fact which a 
jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.‖). 
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lem with the test—that it is unpredictable, vague, confusing, or reliant on 
expert testimony.
137
  The authors also argue that these difficulties are mul-
tiplied by the fact that music has a ―unique‖ quality that sometimes makes 
it impossible to discuss in concrete terms.
138
  The authors, however, fail to 
take the next and most critical step, which is to allege that these difficulties 
result in errant outcomes in the cases.  What the authors truly desire, then, 
is a predictable roadmap to the results; they want an ―is‖ or ―isn‘t‖—not a 
―maybe‖ or ―maybe not.‖  To be sure, that is not the nature of music. 
While music may be ―difficult‖ in some respects, it is an art with an es-
tablished and relatively consistent vocabulary, and musicians have been 
trying to remove the preconceived barriers from the public mind.
139
  Com-
poser Aaron Copland, concerned with growing popular confusion about 
concert-hall music, formulated a treatise to guide listeners through their 
discomfort with the genre.
140
  After explaining his concern that music tends 
to elicit more feelings of confusion than the theatre or novels, he assures 
his readers that ―[i]f [they] have any feelings of inferiority about [their] 
musical reactions, [they should] try to rid [themselves] of them.  They are 
often not justified.‖141  Copland only asks that his readers learn to ―recog-
nize a melody.‖142  However, the authors that this paper discusses employ 
the rhetoric that music is ―difficult‖ and incapable of proper analysis by a 
jury.  Once again, the argument turns in on itself because the authors can-
not explain why music is too difficult for a jury or why any other fact-
finding body would be better suited to relate to the lay listener. 
As an art or a science, music requires a listener.  Psychologist Carl E. 
Seashore explored the scientific aspects of ―the musical mind‖ in his Psy-
chology of Music.
143
  When he described the esthetics of music in terms of 
a normative science, he defined four aspects: ―the musical medium, the 
musical form, the musical message, and the musical response.‖144  In Sea-
shore‘s formulation, the listener is the party who determines the same 
questions that we ask when we look for copyright infringement: 
What is the characteristic of the musical message as it is received?  
What are the factors, physiological, physical, psychological, and 
esthetic, which determine this response in hearing, interpretation, 
  
 137. See supra Part II. 
 138. Id. 
 139. STANLEY CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 186 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) 
(1969); AARON COPLAND, WHAT TO LISTEN FOR IN MUSIC 4–5 (Penguin Books 1999) (1953). 
 140. COPLAND, supra note 139, at 4–5. 
 141. Id. at 4. 
 142. Id. at 5. 
 143. CARL E. SEASHORE, PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC 1 (Dover Publ‘ns 1967) (1938). 
 144. Id. at 377. 
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and enjoyment of music? . . .  Central among these [problems that 
the listener‘s perspective determines], however, are the psychology 
of musical appreciation, the limits of the capacity for hearing, for 




Those that wish to remove the jury or diminish its ability to make a 
fact-based finding, therefore, remove the questions that a listener‘s pers-
pective can answer from the legal inquiry.  Mladen Milicevic has framed 
this position by completely removing structural analysis from the question, 
concluding that there are no perceived objective elements of music.
146
  
Much like Seashore, Milicevic argues that the relationship between the 
structure and human perception is the meaning of the music and is essential 
and, ideally, inseverable.
147
  Therefore, it is essential that music infringe-
ment cases have a listener‘s standard. 
Critics have failed to offer any proof that music presents a problem 
that juries, in their classical sense, cannot conquer.  In fact, there have been 
no methodological or empirical studies that demonstrate disparate out-
comes.  The true difficulty for practitioners is that they do not have a me-
thod to predict the outcome of the case.  The answer they and the above 
authors seek, however, would start creating a ―roadmap to infringement.‖  
The proposals set forth would also remove a critical inquiry about the mu-
sic at hand: the relationship between the structural analysis and the au-
dience‘s perception. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article began by describing the critics‘ concern about describing 
or analyzing an ―ineffable‖ art form.  Philosopher Stanley Cavell adds an 
important observation: 
 The serious attempt to articulate a response to a piece of music 
where, more than reverie, has characteristically stimulated mathe-
matics or metaphysics—as though music has never quite become 
one of the facts of life, but shunts between an overwhelming di-
rectness and an overweening mystery.  Is this because music, as 
we know it, is the newest of the great arts and just has not had the 
time to learn how to criticize itself; or because it inherently resists 
verbal transcriptions?  (Both have been said, as both are said in ac-
  
 145. Id. at 26. 
 146. Mladen Milicevic, Deconstructing Musical Structure, 3 ORGANISED SOUND 27, 27 (1998). 
 147. Id.  
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counting for the lack of a canon of criticism about the cinema.)  
Whatever the cause, the absence of humane criticism (of course 
there are isolated instances) seems particularly striking against the 
fact that music has, among the arts, the most, perhaps the only, 
systematic and precise vocabulary for the description and analysis 
of its objects.  Somehow that possession must itself be liability; as 
though one now undertook to criticize a poem or novel armed with 
complete control of medieval rhetoric but ignorant of the modes of 
criticism developed in the past two centuries.
148
 
Cavell describes the debate that has historically aligned in camps that 
write or describe music programmatically (using extra-music imagery or 
subject matter) or absolutely (without extra-musical devices).
149
  As de-
scribed in Part III, modern legal scholars would align with Cavell‘s ―ma-
thematics‖ category, placing a jury within the variety of confines described 
above.  Because the authors are often driven towards predictable results, 
they would seek to abate any sort of metaphysical or ―ineffable‖ reaction 
that a lay ear might have to a piece of music.  However, the lay ear should 
be the ―gold standard,‖ and artists, publishers, and record companies (and 
their lawyers) should accept the risk that their industry operates within a 
realm where art and commerce may lead to ―indescribable‖ results. 
 
  
 148. CAVELL, supra note 139, at 185–86. 
 149. BURKHOLDER ET AL., supra note 76, at 60305 (describing the programmatic and absolutist 
camps). 
